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In recent years, businesses have emerged that allow consumers to share assets in a new 
way through innovations in technology. Service 
providers and consumers can now arrange for 
services on demand through a common software 
platform (e.g., Uber, Etsy, or Airbnb). The rise 
of  this digitally enabled “sharing economy” 
has transformed the way that many Americans 
travel, shop, and vacation.1 Through a mobile 
application or website, platform operators provide 
information about the service provider’s location 
and service history, facilitate online payment, and 
resolve disputes.2 The resulting “shared economy” 
offers alternatives—often with lower prices—to 
long established industries.
More specifically, advances in information and 
communication technologies, combined with 
location data from global positioning systems, has 
led to increased efficiencies in the provision of  
transportation services.3 Companies like Lyft and 
Uber seek to provide prearranged transportation 
services for compensation using online or mobile 
applications to connect drivers to passengers. 
The growth of  companies like Uber and Lyft 
has been explosive.4 As of  March 2015, within 
just four years of  beginning operations, the 
number of  Uber vehicles in New York City had 
overtaken the number of  traditional taxis within 
the city.5 Consumers and other advocates praise 
Uber and Lyft for their ability to provide new 
economic efficiency compared to traditional 
ridesharing options like taxis and car services. 
The debate over Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) like Uber and Lyft has become quite polarizing in recent years, 
leaving many municipalities unsure how to move forward regarding regulation. Municipalities can choose to enforce traditional 
regulations, applying the same safety standards and supply constraints to TNCs as taxi companies. Or, municipalities can view 
TNCs as entities different than taxi providers and allow TNCs to regulate themselves through regulatory organizations that 
operate outside the scope of  government intervention. States and cities such as Massachusetts, Colorado, and Houston are pioneers 
in the regulation of  TNCs. However, each city or state has implemented regulations that fall within the spectrum of  complete 
governmental regulation and self-regulation. Ultimately, a moderate approach to regulation of  both TNCs and taxi companies is a 
reasonable response to the TNC debate. 
These online platforms eliminate the concept of  
calling a dispatcher, hailing a taxi on the street, or 
exchanging cash.6 Many argue that the advent of  
Uber and similar technologies has propelled the 
“ridesharing” concept into the 21st century.  
However, these platforms tend to be in tension 
with existing regulatory frameworks that 
ensure safety, quality, and supply standards. 
Unlike a taxi company or limousine service, 
Uber and Lyft provide transportation service 
through individually owned vehicles rather 
than commercially owned vehicles.7 This 
difference allows Uber and Lyft to operate in 
a regulatory grey area where many state and 
local governments do not hold these companies 
to the same legal and regulatory standards as 
commercial vehicle services.8 
For the purposes of  this article, I will refer to 
software platforms, such as Uber and Lyft, as 
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs). I 
use this term because governments are starting 
to consider implementing broad regulations for 
TNCs with the expectation that new companies 
will emerge.9 I will also use the term “platform” 
to describe the tool created by TNCs to facilitate 
interaction between drivers and consumers.10
Within the literature, there is debate about the 
correct way to regulate TNCs. Some argue 
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question of  how to regulate TNCs moving 
forward is important for municipalities as policy 
makers consider the future of  transportation 
and strategies for integrating technology into 
municipal systems. Understanding the normative 
arguments for and against TNC regulation will 
allow municipalities to respond to the emergence 
of  new technology and maintain public safety. In 
this article, I will examine the policy arguments 
surrounding the regulation of  TNCs. I will then 
discuss how the regulatory debate has played 
out on the municipal level, highlighting various 
approaches that cities have taken to TNC 
regulation. Ultimately, I suggest that municipal 
and state transportation planners take a moderate 
approach to regulation by seeking to promote 
public safety without hindering innovation.23
Self-Regulation
The debate over TNCs has become polarizing, 
leaving many municipalities unsure about how 
to move forward regarding regulation. At the 
core of  the debate is the question: What type 
of  company are software platforms like Uber 
and Lyft? Are they transportation providers or 
are they technology companies that facilitate 
transportation interactions? Those who view 
TNCs as the latter believe that traditional 
regulations limit the efficiencies caused by the 
facilitation of  the interactions between a willing 
provider and a willing consumer. Instead of  
traditional regulations, these scholars argue for 
the creation of  self-regulatory mechanisms that 
can correct externalities and protect consumers 
from potential harm without stifling innovation.24, 
25, 26
Self-regulation is not the absence of  regulation, 
but it is the reorganization of  the responsibility 
to maintain safety and quality standards to an 
industry-specific organization or company rather 
than to traditional government oversight.27 
that traditional regulations, requiring extensive 
background checks, vehicle inspections, and taxi 
medallions to control supply, only protect taxis 
from competition and stifle innovation.11, 12, 13 
Instead, these scholars assert that governments 
must rethink and address decades-old rules and 
entrenched interests to continue to maintain the 
efficiencies of  the new ridesharing movement.14 
Scholars suggest that instead of  strict government 
regulation, TNCs should self-regulate in order 
to mitigate safety and supply concerns while 
preventing government failures through over-
regulation.15 Proponents of  self-regulation 
do not intend to equate self-regulation with 
deregulation or the absence of  regulation. 
Rather, self-regulation is the reallocation of  
regulatory responsibility to parties other than 
the government that can provide oversight and 
enforce standards.16
In contrast, other scholars argue that regulatory 
standards serve economic and social purposes 
and should apply to TNCs. These scholars do 
not view TNCs differently than commercial 
transportation services, and they argue that 
self-regulation would not be enough to maintain 
the safety, quality, and supply standards that 
the government should protect.17, 18, 19, 20 
Transportation services such as taxis, charter 
buses, and limousine services are all subject to 
specific regulations such as driver background 
checks, vehicle inspections, and limitations on 
the number of  licenses issued. These regulations 
come at a cost to traditional transportation 
providers, and many scholars suggest that TNCs 
have been able to cut prices for consumers 
only because they have circumvented these 
regulations.21, 22
Ridesharing services such as Uber and Lyft 
are challenging the fundamental structures 
of  the long-established regulatory framework 
for commercial ridesharing services. The 
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transportation services, the exchange of  
information does not affect the imbalance of  
information because it is difficult to give feedback 
to drivers and to disseminate that information 
to future consumers.31, 32 Software platforms can 
now assure consumers of  quality through easily 
accessible feedback systems.33, 34 For example, 
a deficient vehicle is likely to receive a negative 
rating. The self-regulatory organization (SRO) 
will receive the rating and either remove the 
vehicle from the fleet or address it with the service 
provider. Research with TNC drivers show that 
in general TNC platforms respond to feedback 
effectively, and administrators follow-up with 
every negative comment.35 These self-regulating 
mechanisms, through consumer feedback, help to 
mitigate the market failure, reduce asymmetrical 
information, and ensure quality of  service.  
TNCs have created a platform where reputation 
derived from consumer feedback is crucial 
to the success of  the company. The ability 
to easily exchange this feedback information 
allows consumers to choose between TNCs 
and taxi companies based on reputation. 
Studies on regulating reputation show that 
competitive companies are more likely to point 
out substandard performance without the need 
for regulation.36 Eric Goldman refers to this as 
the “secondary invisible hand.” The result is a 
self-regulating market that provides strong checks 
on improper behavior and leads to a self-policing 
community that seeks to weed out bad actors.37
Another benefit of  self-regulation is TNCs’ ability 
to implement dynamic pricing. Through self-
regulation, TNCs adjust their prices in real time 
to balance supply and demand, which proponents 
of  traditional regulation often consider an 
externality of  taxi deregulation.38 The goal of  
dynamic pricing is to motivate drivers to begin 
work, relocate to areas with high demand, or 
to deter low-value trips for consumers.39 For 
This type of  regulatory approach requires 
governments to envision software platforms—like 
Uber and Lyft—not as regulated entities but 
as key parts of  the regulatory scheme in which 
the companies work as an industry to maintain 
standards.28 Because of  the platforms’ role as 
facilitator, the platform can enforce quality 
and safety standards, balance asymmetrical 
information, and internalize externalities before 
and during the transaction, all without involving 
mandates from the government.
The existence of  third-party software platforms 
and their ability to effectively verify and facilitate 
the correction of  safety and information 
market failures show that self-regulation is not 
an impossible or ineffective policy approach. 
Scholars argue that TNC business models provide 
them with a strong enough financial incentive to 
ensure a high-quality exchange between service 
provider and consumer. 
The most compelling evidence in support of  
self-regulation is the way that TNCs balance 
asymmetrical information to assure quality of  
service, and the incorporation of  dynamic pricing 
to handle oversupply of  services. The growth of  
information technology without the constraints 
of  regulation can provide the possibility of  
better consumer welfare.29 Increased information 
expands the knowledge exchanged between 
producers and consumers, and it creates strong 
reputational incentives for firms to improve their 
level of  service. Self-regulation policy forms part 
of  a broader innovation-enhancing solution by 
providing guidelines for TNC regulation outside 
of  the realm of  government intervention.30 
Modern online feedback mechanisms have 
made it easier for a balanced and honest 
exchange of  information between parties during 
TNC transactions. In traditional commercial 
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example, because of  the absence of  geographic 
regulations for drivers, Uber was able to call 
on over 10,000 drivers in metropolitan Boston, 
Massachusetts when its transit system experienced 
delays. These drivers were motivated to work 
because Uber had implemented surge pricing and 
was charging three times the normal fare.40 This 
type of  innovation allows TNCs to attract new 
drivers to areas in need. 
Scholars in support of  self-regulation suggest that 
the implementation of  traditional regulation of  
TNCs is a result of  entrenched political interests. 
TNCs challenge taxi services to modernize, and 
the desire to regulate that service does not arise 
from the need to protect public welfare but from 
a desire to protect the taxi industry.41 Scholars 
assert that subjecting TNCs to commercial service 
regulations would ultimately hurt consumers by 
maintaining the status quo, artificially lowering 
supply, and raising prices.
Self-regulation of  TNCs is not the rejection of  
regulation, but instead seeks to correct market 
failures without leading to a government failure 
through over-regulation. Empirical studies show 
SROs often are effective if  participants view 
them as a legitimate authority with the ability 
to enforce rules.42 The incorporation of  SROs 
fosters innovation while allowing TNCs to adjust 
to market forces with sophisticated software 
platforms. 
Traditional Regulation 
In contrast, many argue that Uber and Lyft are 
transportation services aided by technology, 
and therefore governments should hold them 
to the same regulatory standards as taxis, 
limousines, and other commercial ride services. 
These regulatory standards include extensive 
background checks, vehicle inspections, 
licensing requirements, and the allocation of  
taxi medallions to control supply.  Traditional 
transportation service regulations should apply 
to TNCs because each regulation seeks to 
internalize the externalities that TNCs currently 
produce.43, 44, 45 
The most obvious reason for taxi regulation 
is the mandate for safety standards and 
public protection. These regulations include 
provisions for driver, fleet, or vehicle background 
checks, vehicle insurance requirements, and 
safety inspections.46 Similarly, taxi regulations 
promote public safety by mandating that taxi 
drivers participate in additional driver training. 
Moreover, in most cities regulators set taxi fares 
to provide price predictability, eliminate price 
gouging, and ensure a reasonable return for 
owners and drivers.47 
Unlike traditional regulations, feedback loops in 
self-regulation systems do not capture dangers 
that individuals cannot see and do not account 
for dishonest feedback. For example, a driver may 
receive a five-star rating for rides and car quality 
from passengers. Yet this five-star rating does 
not encompass a problem such as the vehicle’s 
brakes being in poor condition.48 Feedback 
systems do not protect against risk that consumers 
cannot see, unlike the approval of  a regulated 
in-person car inspection. Furthermore, recent 
studies have called into question how well the 
rating system works. Uber indicated that in San 
Francisco, California only one percent of  Uber 
drivers received one- or two-star ratings.49 This 
may be perceived as an example of  high quality, 
or as an indicator that customers hesitate to 
provide negative ratings because they recognize 
the significant penalties that drivers receive for 
them. Overall, the legitimacy of  the ratings 
is questionable and should not be the only 
mechanism to ensure quality control. 
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Information technology cannot protect against 
equity-based externalities. While taxi drivers are 
notorious for racist practices, such as ignoring 
minority customers on the streets, TNCs are not 
much better.50 Uber drivers are required to accept 
90 percent of  the rides sent their way. Because of  
this self-regulatory rule, studies have suggested 
that both Uber and Lyft drivers participate in 
“redlining” by not providing services to poor 
and minority neighborhoods.51 In addition, 
many argue that dynamic pricing disadvantages 
lower-income people and violates traditional 
regulations against price gouging. For example, 
during Hurricane Sandy, Uber implemented 
surge pricing. As a result, New York State 
officials criticized Uber and have implemented 
regulations to prevent surge pricing during states 
of  emergency.52 
In general, for every self-regulating mechanism 
that TNCs implement, there are still significant 
limitations. Traditional transportation service 
regulations provide a thorough vetting of  
practices that assure quality and equitable service. 
TNC Regulation in Practice
States and municipalities are responding to the 
arrival of  TNCs using a variety of  tactics. Some 
cities have established themselves as “TNC-
friendly,” with light regulations. Other cities have 
taken a firmer approach and have insisted that 
TNCs play by their existing rules. In practice, 
regulation usually falls between complete self-
regulation or TNC adherence to traditional 
regulation. Municipal and state planners 
considering the extent of  statutory constraints 
imposed on TNCs must consider an array of  
scenarios, goals, and needs when deciding on a 
course of  action.
Colorado’s TNC regulations are considered 
some of  the most flexible and least onerous 
in the United States. In June 2014, Colorado 
became the first state to authorize the use of  
mobile ridesharing apps.53 Governor John 
Hickenlooper signed the “Transportation 
Network Company Act,” which required either 
the driver to carry a personal insurance policy 
that acknowledges TNC activity, or for the 
rideshare company to provide primary insurance 
coverage.54 The law exempts TNC drivers from 
fingerprinting and criminal background checks, 
which are required of  taxi drivers, in favor of  
the standard background checks performed by 
TNC companies.55, 56 The TNC Act in Colorado 
represents “ride-share friendly regulation.” 
Colorado promotes public safety by requiring 
insurance coverage, supports TNC self-regulation 
of  background checks, and treats TNCs as 
separate entities from traditional taxi services. 
Massachusetts took a different regulatory 
approach to prioritizing public safety and 
recognizing transportation innovation by 
providing flexibility to TNCs while compensating 
the taxi industry. After months of  contentious 
debate, Massachusetts passed strong TNC 
regulations in August 2016 that both taxi unions 
and TNCs support.57 The ride-for-hire bill gives 
the Massachusetts Department of  Public Utilities 
regulatory authority over TNCs by establishing 
insurance minimums, reporting requirements for 
TNCs, and imposing the strongest background 
check system in the nation.58 Taxi and livery 
industries are compensated by collecting a 20-
cent per ride fee from TNCs.59 Massachusetts set 
constraints on TNCs by regulating public safety 
standards under the control of  a government 
entity, and leveled the playing field between 
TNCs and traditional transportation services by 
imposing a fee on TNCs that goes towards aiding 
innovation in the taxi industry.  
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states and municipalities consider the following 
regulatory approaches in the near term:
• Minimum insurance requirements 
to address the insurance “gap”: 
Most states and municipalities that have 
implemented regulations for TNCs require 
minimum insurance requirements to 
protect against the insurance gap—the time 
that ridesharing drivers are not providing 
transportation services for hire but have the 
app open and are available to receive a trip 
request.62 Regulations that address this gap 
require either the driver to carry personal 
insurance that covers the gap, or require 
TNCs to provide coverage during this 
period. Either regulation option is sufficient 
to protect public safety, but places the 
burden on different parties.
• Maintain consistent and reasonable 
requirements for background 
checks: There is significant variation 
in depth of  background checks required 
for both TNC drivers and taxi drivers by 
government agencies. In some states and 
municipalities, taxi drivers undergo more 
extensive background checks than their 
TNC counterparts.63 First, government 
agencies should seek to equalize the process 
for background checks for both taxi drivers 
and TNC drivers. Second, governments 
should establish consistent and reasonable 
background check requirements that 
successfully vet individuals without causing 
undue burden on potential low-income and 
minority drivers. 
• Use data to monitor instances of  
discrimination: Governments should 
require TNCs to use their digital platform 
and the wealth of  data it captures to prevent 
While both Colorado and Massachusetts have 
passed TNC legislation, Houston is still debating 
the extent to which it will allow TNCs to self-
regulate. Houston’s existing TNC legislation 
requires potential drivers to complete fingerprint 
background checks and to pay a licensing fee 
of  $200.60 Uber reported that since the passage 
of  the legislation, 20,000 people (two-thirds of  
whom were minority and low-income people) 
completed Uber’s screening process but failed to 
finish the City’s licensing process.61 The company 
has threatened to leave the city, arguing that the 
extensive background checks discourage qualified 
drivers, which undermines the TNC business 
model. TNCs and Houston are still working to 
find legislation that promotes public safety goals 
without driving out potential jobs.
Colorado, Massachusetts, and Houston each 
demonstrate a unique way to approach TNC 
regulation. Governments can be involved in 
the regulation of  TNCs at a minimal level, 
requiring that TNCs and/or their drivers meet 
basic insurance requirements, or governments 
may hold TNCs to the same standards as taxi 
services. The decisions municipalities and state 
governments are making do not fall neatly on 
either end of  the self-regulation versus traditional 
regulation spectrum, but instead question how far 
they will regulate TNCs and/or deregulate the 
taxi industry.    
Next Steps for States and 
Municipalities
Decisions concerning the regulation of  TNCs 
should be considered within the context of  
the specific government agency under which 
their jurisdictions falls, and the needs of  
the community. However, there are several 
moderate regulatory approaches that states and 
municipalities can consider to protect public 
safety and promote innovation. I recommend that 
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discrimination. TNCs can hide the race, 
gender, disability, and home address of  
both drivers and passengers to prevent 
discriminatory feedback.64 Similarly, TNCs 
can use the data to track instances of  
discrimination, and governments can create 
policies or incentives that deter drivers 
who avoid or reject trips in low-income or 
minority neighborhoods.65 
These moderate regulations seek to promote 
safety, correct for discrimination, and level the 
playing field between TNCs and taxis. However, 
any type of  regulation will likely create winners 
and losers in the transportation service industry. 
Planners should carefully consider what is best for 
their specific community and balance the variety 
of  tradeoffs associated with each regulation with 
the desire to protect the public interest. 
Conclusion 
Self-regulation and traditional regulation offer 
solutions for managing TNCs. Self-regulation 
operates on the premise that software platforms 
or third-party organizations sufficiently support 
innovation while dealing with externalities. In 
contrast, traditional regulation proponents argue 
that transportation service regulations serve a 
purpose, and that the government should hold 
TNCs to the same standard. Both arguments 
provide useful policy implications, but the 
acceptance of  just one side of  the debate leaves 
something to be desired. In practice, a moderate 
regulatory approach that balances the interests 
of  TNCs, the taxi industry, and the community 
at large is the best way to promote transportation 
innovation while preserving public safety.
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